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INTRODUCTION 
International income tax law, just like domestic tax law and law in general, 
evolves through political, economic, and social contexts that are complex, 
multifaceted, dynamic, and difficult to study systematically.  Perhaps as a 
result, the underlying theories of international income taxation have been 
static—and unsatisfactory—since they first emerged in the early twentieth 
century.1  Over the last ten years, legal scholars have begun to use what they 
describe as “case studies” in an effort to develop better theories about how 
governments can or should impose taxation on international activities.2  The 
attributes and functions of case studies, while well-studied and documented in 
other disciplines, have not been explored in tax law scholarship. 
This article explores case study research in international tax law 
scholarship and argues that legal scholars could significantly advance 
international tax theory by approaching their case studies more explicitly and 
more methodically.  It advocates especially for an heuristic approach to case 
study research, that is, one that employs qualitative social science research 
methods with the primary goal of identifying new data and developing new 
theoretical approaches for the study of international tax law.  A more 
methodical, qualitative approach to case studies would help legal scholars 
more effectively test established international tax theories and assumptions, 
reveal information that will help new theories and assumptions emerge, and 
create new spaces for policy development in international tax law. 
This article is thus a study of case studies.  The goal is to investigate both 
how and why legal scholars use case studies for developing theory in 
international tax law, and to consider how qualitative case study research 
principles and practices from other disciplines might inform the work 
undertaken by legal scholars.3  As a result, much of this work describes the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International 
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 
261 (2001) (discussing the development of current international tax policy and suggesting how it 
should be reexamined for the twenty-first century). 
 2. The use of the term “legal scholars” is intentionally limiting: this article focuses on the 
use of case studies by academic writers whose principal or only training is in the study of law.  As 
a result, it omits many case studies on topics of international tax law undertaken by economists 
and social scientists.  See WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr. eds., 1990) [hereinafter 
WORLD TAX REFORM] for a sampling of international tax law studies by economists and social 
scientists.  The authors of the case studies discussed in this article are full-time legal professors, 
with three exceptions: Scott Budnick and Ben Seessel, now practicing attorneys, were law 
students when they wrote their case studies, and Andrew Morriss has a joint appointment in the 
law and business schools at his institution. 
 3. This article thus responds directly to earlier calls for legal scholars to engage in a more 
multidisciplinary approach to the study of international tax law.  See, e.g., Allison Christians et 
al., Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 303 
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case studies themselves, including a survey of the scholars’ stated assumptions 
about the purpose and goals for engaging in the case studies, their approaches 
to or methods of building the cases, and their statements about the applicability 
or explanatory value of their case studies.  These descriptions are 
contextualized by social science discourse on the use of case studies for theory 
development. 
Part I begins the inquiry with the criteria I used for choosing the 
scholarship for this study and explores what is meant by the term “case study.”  
Part II explores why legal scholars choose to study cases in their international 
tax scholarship.  Part III examines how these scholars decide what cases to 
study.  Part IV explores the approaches legal scholars have taken to present 
their case studies in international tax law.  Part V examines how international 
tax law scholars assess the applicability or explanatory value of their case 
studies and suggests that while the growing contribution of case studies to 
international tax theory is exciting, legal scholars could engage in case studies 
more productively by consulting the method-related considerations which 
inform social science research. 
I.  WHAT ARE “CASE STUDIES”? 
Beginning an inquiry into the use of case studies in international tax law 
scholarship requires some explanation of what is meant by the term “case 
study.”  The term has not been explicitly defined by international tax law 
scholars.  In the language of social science, a case study is described as “not a 
methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied.”4  In this view, 
one must first determine what constitutes a “case” in order to decide whether a 
case is being studied.5 
Social science discourse includes rigorous debate about what might 
constitute a case, with descriptions ranging from very broad to very specific 
 
(2008) (“[T]ax scholarship should turn to fields such as international relations, organizational 
theory, and political philosophy to provide a broader framework for understanding the rapid 
changes that are taking place in tax policy and politics in the United States and around the 
world.”); Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the 
Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 368 (1998) (encouraging tax scholars to 
expand beyond normativity to embrace empirical studies and narrative projects, using social 
sciences to aid their research); Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 
60 TAX L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2007) [hereinafter Ring, International Tax Relations] (calling for 
integration of “important areas of nontax research into [the] universe” of international tax 
scholarship). 
 4. Robert E. Stake, Qualitative Case Studies, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH 443, 443 (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 
THE SAGE HANDBOOK]. 
 5. See id. at 444. 
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criteria.6  In one view, a case is described in terms of its subject matter: What 
counts as a case is a “phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a 
single measure on any pertinent variable.”7  This subject-oriented description 
permits a very broad view of cases, in which any study of a particular event or 
phenomenon constitutes a case study.8  But most analyses of cases also require 
a purposive element: A case is not defined simply by reference to a subject but 
necessarily implies a purpose for undertaking the study.9  From this 
perspective, a case may be described as “an instance of a class of events . . . 
[which is] a phenomenon of scientific interest . . . that the investigator chooses 
to study with the aim of developing theory (or ‘generic knowledge’) regarding 
the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of 
events.”10  The underlying premise is that the audience expects social science 
research to demonstrate or explain a social phenomenon through the rigorous 
and systematic study of cases.11 
For purposes of analyzing the use of case studies in international tax law 
scholarship, I began by identifying articles on the subject of international 
taxation in which the authors explicitly referred to their content as a “case 
study” (one of which is my own work).12  Not all of the authors of these 
 
 6. See generally Charles C. Ragin, Cases of “What is a Case?,” Introduction to WHAT IS A 
CASE?: EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY 1, 2 (Charles C. Ragin & Howard S. 
Becker eds., 1992) [hereinafter WHAT IS A CASE?] (discussing the wide-ranging application of the 
term “case” to both qualitative and quantitative research conducted in the social sciences). 
 7. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 17 (2005) (describing this view as “[o]ne early 
definition, still widely used” but increasingly rejected by political scientists); see also Harry 
Eckstein, Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in 7 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 
STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY 79, 85 (Fred I. Grenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975). 
 8. See John S. Odell, Case Study Methods in International Political Economy, 2 INT’L 
STUD. PERSP. 161, 162 (2001) (“What counts as a case can be as flexible as the researcher’s 
definition of the subject.  By a case I mean a single instance of an event or phenomenon, such as 
a decision to devalue a currency, a trade negotiation, or an application of economic sanctions.”); 
Ragin, supra note 6, at 2 (“At a minimum, every study is a case study because it is an analysis of 
social phenomena specific to time and place.”). 
 9. See, e.g., GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 18 (“A case study is thus a well-defined 
aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical 
event itself.”). 
 10. Id. at 17–18. 
 11. Ragin, supra note 6, at 2. 
 12. Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income in a Global Economy: Stages in the 
Development of International Income Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 631, 636 (2008); Scott 
Budnick, Internet Taxation & Burkina Faso: A Case Study, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 549, 
549 (2004); Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 639 (2005); Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for 
the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 336 
(2002) [hereinafter “Cockfield,” Digital Biosphere]; Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the 
Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 
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articles discuss the criteria by which they describe their work as a case study—
indeed, very few of them do.  It may be debatable whether the research would 
be considered to constitute case studies by scholars in other disciplines.  Yet 
for purposes of discovering why scholars might be using case studies in 
international tax law scholarship, the fact that these scholars use the term “case 
study” to describe what they are doing seems relevant. 
This is not to say that the handful of articles discussed herein are the only 
articles in which legal scholars use the term “case study” to describe their work 
on the subject of international tax.  First, my source of articles is generally 
limited to legal scholars who publish in law reviews and journals that are 
available in the databases maintained by LexisNexis and Westlaw.13  Any 
article, book, monograph, or other material that is not published in a law 
review or journal included in these databases, not cited by any of the authors of 
the searched publications or not explicitly identified as a case study, is 
therefore excluded.14  Second, because this article focuses on the use of case 
studies for the purpose of developing theory in international tax law 
scholarship, I omitted articles that use case studies solely for purposes of 
description.15 
 
1175 (2001) [hereinafter “Cockfield,” Transforming the Internet]; Steven A. Dean, Attractive 
Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 411 (2005); Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 86; 
Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 
B.C. L. REV. 79, 85 (2002) [hereinafter “Ring” One Nation]; Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in 
the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 159 
(2008) [hereinafter Sovereignty Debate]; Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of 
International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555, 559 (2007); Ben Seessel, Comment, The 
Bermuda Reinsurance ‘Loophole’: A Case Study of Tax Shelters and Tax Havens in the 
Globalizing Economy, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 541, 543 (2001). 
 13. To identify case studies in international tax scholarship, I searched the legal scholarship 
databases in LexisNexis and Westlaw for articles that included both the terms “international tax” 
and “case study” (including variations).  Of course, I also Googled “international tax case study,” 
which yielded over ten million hits.  A review of the first 1,000 hits (an admittedly arbitrary 
sample) revealed most of the articles I had otherwise identified for this study, but no additional 
articles meeting my selection criteria. 
 14. Because of these limitations, there are probably theory-developing international tax case 
studies written by legal scholars, especially those outside of the United States and Canada, that I 
have missed.  I hope that as I continue this research, and discuss it with others, any such studies 
will come to light. 
 15. For example, I excluded an article in which the author used what he identified as a case 
study to investigate how profits from international Internet software sales would be taxed by the 
United States in alternate scenarios involving the physical location of the server.  See J. Clifton 
Fleming Jr., US Income Taxation of Profits from Software Sales by Australian Vendors into the 
US via the Internet, 4 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. ANN. 97, 97 (1999), reprinted in 19 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 675 (1999) (providing a thorough description useful for subsequent studies, but not itself 
purporting to develop theory). 
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In addition to the self-identified international tax case studies, I identified 
an additional article, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in Offshore 
Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles (“The Saga of 
the Netherlands Antilles”), as an international tax case study.16  This article 
differs from the others in that it does not explicitly use the term “case study” to 
describe its approach.  Even so, I included it in my study, first, because it 
embodies the case study concept in general, in some ways more so than the 
self-identified case studies, and second, because it is the sole example of a 
primarily heuristic approach—the authors undertook the case study for the 
purpose of developing new information from which to draw and to test new 
theoretical approaches to existing questions of international tax law.17  Perhaps 
many additional international tax law articles could be described as case 
studies to varying degrees.  However, I chose each of the case studies 
discussed herein for its unique approach to the studied topic, as discussed 
below. 
In the self-identifying case study articles chosen for this study, the authors 
identified tax avoidance practices;18 a proposed set of legal rules;19 an existing 
set of legal rules;20 the formation of a set of legal rules;21 a set of international 
tax agreements;22 a proposed set of international standards;23 a country’s 
 
 16. Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in 
Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 377 
(2009). 
 17. Id. at 383 (using the experience of the Netherlands Antilles “as a lens through which to 
examine” how “onshore” legal systems and “the international regulatory climate may affect other 
international financial centers, both onshore and offshore”). 
 18. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 674 (using the issue of thin-capitalization or earnings-
stripping, a means of tax avoidance employed by multinational companies, as a case); Cockfield, 
Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 367 (using the tax planning efforts of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
to reduce sales tax burdens on Walmart.com as a case); Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 90 
(using four methods of international tax avoidance as cases); Seessel, supra note 12, at 543 (using 
tax avoidance through reinsurance mechanisms as a case). 
 19. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1188 (using a draft proposal on 
e-commerce taxation by an OECD working party as a case); Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra 
note 12, at 206 (using European Union efforts to harmonize the corporate tax base as a case). 
 20. Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at 216 (using a WTO ruling against U.S. 
export tax incentive rules as a case); Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 617 (using a set of legal 
rules—the entity classification election regime—as a case). 
 21. Dean, supra note 12, at 411 (using “the creation of the 1996 check-the-box entity 
classification regulations” as a case). 
 22. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 86 (using “the development of a 
system to relieve double taxation” tax treaties as a case). 
 23. Id. at 122–23 (using United States participation in an OECD-led campaign to curb 
harmful tax competition as a case). 
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experience with a specific set of legal rules;24 and a hypothetical international 
agreement25 as their “cases.”  None of these articles defined the studied 
phenomena or events as cases by reference to identifying criteria such as those 
described above from the social science literature (i.e., chosen to serve a 
specific scientific or intellectual purpose).  In each case, the articles simply 
identify the event or phenomenon as a “case” without further discussion.  In 
The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, the article that does not self-identify as a 
case study, the case in question is the history that led the Netherlands Antilles 
to become a notoriously famous tax haven.26 
Are these cases? Does it matter whether they are or not?  It might, if 
defining the case as such helps scholars explain the goals and expectations 
behind the decision to focus on a particular event or phenomenon.27  In the 
social science literature, the debate over what constitutes a case takes place in 
part because there is some concern about the purpose of undertaking the study, 
as well as the reliability of the conclusions to be drawn from the study.28  
These concerns ought to inform legal scholarship as well. 
Social scientists suggest that one of the most problematic aspects of using 
case study methods in scientific inquiry is the possibility that researchers may 
choose unrepresentative or otherwise inappropriate cases to “prove” a specific 
point.29  In statistical (quantitative) research, the problem with this tendency, 
called “selection bias,” is that the researcher may choose subjects for study that 
are not sufficiently random, causing doubt about the study’s conclusions.  The 
selection bias problem is what leads scientific researchers to caution one 
another not to “select cases on the dependent variable”—that is, not to choose 
only those cases that demonstrate the outcome sought for the research.30  
 
 24. Budnick, supra note 12, at 556 (using Burkina Faso’s experience with e-commerce tax 
and tariff rules established by developed countries in the context of the WTO as a case). 
 25. Christians, supra note 12, at 666 (identifying a hypothesized tax treaty between the 
United States and Ghana, based on other U.S. tax treaties with developing countries, as a case). 
 26. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 414–19. 
 27. Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The 
Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1189 (2006) (“We must have some theories, or at least 
organizing assumptions, that guide us in what we look for and ask.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Ragin, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 29. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that case studies “are particularly 
prone to versions of ‘selection bias’ that concern statistical researchers”); Christopher H. Achen 
& Duncan Snidal, Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies, 41 WORLD POL. 
143, 160 (1989); David Collier & James Mahoney, Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in 
Qualitative Work, 49 WORLD POL. 56, 59 (1996) (“Selection bias is commonly understood as 
occurring when some form of selection process in either the design of the study or the real-world 
phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic error.”); Barbara 
Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative 
Politics, 2 POL. ANALYSIS 131, 131 (1990). 
 30. See, e.g., Collier & Mahoney, supra note 29, at 60. 
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Selection bias is identified as a problem to the extent that the goal is to show 
that one factor (variable) caused or is predicted to cause another.31  The 
concern is that in choosing cases that exhibit selected features or outcomes, the 
researcher might ignore contradictory cases or over-generalize from the 
selected cases to wider populations.32  In other words, the particular case being 
studied, which may or may not be representative, might cause us to either 
overstate or understate the relationship between different aspects of the objects 
of our study.33  This problem might be especially acute in tax scholarship, 
since this scholarship (like much legal scholarship) is typically normative 
rather than scientifically inquisitive in nature.34 
The question this raises for international tax law scholars using case 
studies (as for any researcher) is, thus, what can be learned both about and 
from the event or phenomenon identified as the case.35  Selection bias may not 
necessarily constitute a problem for case study research in international tax law 
scholarship, but awareness of the possibility of bias might help tax law 
scholars build their cases more explicitly and more persuasively.  For instance, 
a scholar might intentionally choose a case that exhibits particular features or a 
particular outcome in order to make a point about those features or that 
outcome.36  Legal scholars might take this approach because they wish to 
identify variables that might lead to a selected outcome, or those that “are not 
necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome.”37  In this 
deductive structure of inquiry, the research starts with a broad theory or 
question and searches for a case that demonstrates or explains.38 
This perspective on choosing cases, while potentially quite useful, does not 
describe how many legal scholars frame their research.  Instead, it is typically 
through the intense study of a specific legal rule or phenomenon that legal 
scholars come to view the studied rule or phenomenon as a “case” that 
 
 31. In such a project, the social scientist seeks to show that “whatever variation is being 
exploited for the purpose of investigating causal relationships is the product of the causal factor of 
interest . . . and not of other confounding factors.”  JOHN GERRING, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 212 (2007).  The principle is termed “ceteris paribus,” or “all other 
things being equal.”  Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 27, at 1186. 
 33. See, e.g., Collier & Mahoney, supra note 29, at 71–72. 
 34. See, e.g., GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 25 (“This form of selection bias is far 
more common in political argumentation than in social science case studies.”). 
 35. Stake, supra note 4, at 443. 
 36. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 23 (observing that qualitative researchers might 
intentionally “choose cases that share a particular outcome”); Ragin, supra note 6, at 5 (noting 
that researchers normally define a problem broadly, identify relevant variables, and then collect 
information on each variable). 
 37. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 23. 
 38. See Ragin, supra note 6, at 5. 
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demonstrates or explains a theory or question.39  In this inductive structure of 
inquiry, the theory or question emerges from the study of the case.40  This 
approach forces the researcher to continually ask, “[w]hat is this a case of?”41  
For some social scientists, this approach may be perceived to undertake case 
selection in the abstract, a potentially problematic method of research design.42  
For others, inductive empirical work is valuable because it leads to theoretical 
discovery.43  The premise is that theoretical understanding emerges when data 
is gathered gradually through successive rounds of inquiry on a specific 
subject.44 This acceptance of inductive learning from case study is encouraging 
for legal scholars, who learn from studying cases as an epistemological 
matter.45  We are trained to gain knowledge by reading, analyzing, and 
categorizing individual cases—albeit typically packaged in the form of judicial 
opinions.46  Social science research can help us conceptualize cases more 
broadly and understand them as reflecting social phenomena.47 
Thinking in these terms about what defines a case might help international 
tax law scholars more explicitly articulate our purposes in undertaking case 
studies and, therefore, guide the reader, both in understanding the parameters 
of the research and in judging the value of the case within these stated 
 
 39. Interview with Steven A. Dean, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., in Portland, Or. 
(Mar. 31, 2010) (on file with author). 
 40. Ragin, supra note 6, at 6. 
Strong preconceptions are likely to hamper conceptual development.  Researchers 
probably will not know what their cases are until the research . . . is virtually completed.  
What it is a case of will coalesce gradually, sometimes catalytically, and the final 
realization of the case’s nature may be the most important part of the interaction between 
ideas and evidence. 
Id. 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. GERRING, supra note 31, at 71.  From this perspective, since the purpose of all social 
science research is to demonstrate or prove an inference, “[i]t is impossible to pose questions of 
research design until one has at least a general idea of what one’s research question is.”  Id. 
 43. See Douglas Harper, Small N’s and Community Case Studies, in WHAT IS A CASE?, 
supra note 6, at 139, 139 (“[T]he deductive, natural science model, with specific hypothesis 
testing and statistical analysis, may not allow us to see the most sociologically meaningful 
boundaries of cases or the complexities of their social processes.”); Charles C. Ragin, “Casing” 
and the Process of Social Inquiry, in WHAT IS A CASE?, supra note 6, at 217, 220 (“Emprical 
research often proceeds without clear guidance from theory. . . . [C]ases often must be delimited 
or found in the course of research. . . . Cases often must be found because they cannot be 
specified beforehand.”). 
 44. Harper, supra note 43, at 141. 
 45. Reza Banakar & Max Travers, Law, Sociology and Method, in THEORY AND METHOD IN 
SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH 1, 12 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2005). 
 46. Edmund M. Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 381 (1952) (quoting 
Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17 A.B.A. REP. 473, 489 (1894)). 
 47. See Banakar & Travers, supra note 45, at 12–13. 
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parameters.  Whether choosing a case to study or deciding that a specific rule 
or phenomenon is, in fact, a case of something, legal scholars inevitably—if 
not explicitly—decide whether their case may or should be viewed as 
applicable to other cases, and whether the case may be used to test an existing 
theory or a new theory.48  The next sections examine these issues in more 
detail, exploring how international tax scholars choose their cases, how they 
approach their research, and what conclusions they draw from their research. 
II.  CHOOSING TO STUDY A CASE: GOALS AND PURPOSES 
Why do scholars engage in case studies?  From the perspective of social 
science, a case study may be undertaken to describe or illustrate an event or 
phenomenon that is intrinsically interesting,49 because the case is instrumental 
in providing insight or drawing (or re-drawing) a generalization,50 or because 
the case is one of many that may be compared for the purpose of investigating 
“a phenomenon, population, or general condition.”51  One typology suggests 
that case studies are undertaken “for identity, for explanation, or for control.”52  
Perhaps most closely aligned with the study of law, case studies may be used 
“to illustrate a point, a condition, or a category—something important for 
instruction.”53  As these typologies suggest, not all case studies are undertaken 
to develop theory.  The international tax case studies discussed herein thus 
represent a subset of a larger universe of case studies.  This subset is the 
subject of its own typology in the social science literature, which may be 
 
 48. See, e.g., GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75 (describing these issues in the design 
of case study research). 
 49. Odell, supra note 8, at 163 (“Many cases are selected for investigation because they are 
recent or seem intrinsically important. . . . Understanding crucial break points is as important as 
testing any hypothesis that might be valid between them.”); Stake, supra note 4, at 445. 
 50. GEORGE & BENNETT supra note 7, at 5 (describing a case study as “the detailed 
examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may 
be generalizable to other events”); Odell, supra note 8, at 163 (“The disciplined interpretive case 
study interprets or explains an event by applying a known theory to the new terrain.”); Stake, 
supra note 4, at 445. 
 51. Stake, supra note 4, at 445.  Stake defines the third approach above as a multiple or 
collective case study and describes it as an “instrumental study extended to several cases,” in 
which the cases are chosen “because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better 
understanding, and perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases.”  Id. at 446.  
See also Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 85 (exemplifying a multiple or collective case 
study). 
 52. Harrison C. White, Cases are for Identity, for Explanation, or for Control, in WHAT IS A 
CASE?, supra note 6, at 83, 83. Of course, these are not exclusive: “Reports and authors often do 
not fit neatly into the three categories.”  Stake, supra note 4, at 447. 
 53. Stake, supra note 4, at 447 (citation omitted).  “For decades, professors in law schools 
and business schools have paraded cases in this manner.”  Id. 
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useful in considering the reasons why international tax law scholars might be 
turning to case studies in developing their scholarship.54 
The typology of theory-building studies includes four types of cases that 
seem to typify the purposes for which the international tax case studies were 
undertaken: “disciplined configurative,” “theory testing,” “plausibility probes,” 
and “heuristic.”55  Each of these types of cases is described below in the 
context of the international tax case studies that seem to reflect these profiles.56  
Many of the studies can be described by more than one of these four types, 
even though some scientists might argue that, in social science terms, some or 
all of these projects fail to qualify as case studies at all.  Legal analysis is not 
social science research, and it is not suggested here that these international tax 
case studies meet the rigorous standards of social science research methods or 
methodologies.  Instead, the purpose of this characterizing exercise is both to 
explore the reasons legal scholars might engage in case studies to develop 
international tax theory and to suggest that legal scholars could do a better job 
of clearly identifying their purposes in undertaking a given study, giving 
readers—including other researchers and policymakers—a better 
understanding of the value of this type of research. 
A. Disciplined Configurative Cases: Exemplifying an Established Theory 
In keeping with the theme that in the legal context, case studies are often 
used to illustrate a point, six of the international tax case studies appear to fit 
the description of “disciplined configurative cases.”  These are studies 
undertaken for the purpose of using established international tax theories in 
order to explain the existence or evolution of legal rules and practices.  The six 
articles that seem to fit this profile are The Quest to Tax Interest Income: 
Stages in the Development of International Taxation (“Stages of International 
Taxation”);57 Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: a Case Study in 
 
 54. See generally GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75 (outlining what qualifies as a 
“disciplined configurative” case study); Eckstein, supra note 7 (discussing case study method in 
political science); Arend Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, 65 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 682 (1971) (discussing comparative politics methodology vis-à-vis traditional 
political science methodology). 
 55. See GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75.  George and Bennett include two 
additional types of cases in their typology, namely “[a]theoretical/configurative idiographic case 
studies,” which are described as “good descriptions” that “do not cumulate or contribute directly 
to theory,” and “[b]uilding block” studies that “identify common patterns or serve a particular 
kind of heuristic purpose.”  Id. at 75–76.  Other researchers have used different variations of these 
terms.  Because they do not directly affect or develop theory, I have omitted atheoretical case 
studies from my analysis; I have also omitted the building block category because I have not 
identified any case studies that seem to fit this particular type. 
 56. Of course, most of the case studies fit in more than one category to relative degrees. 
 57. See Benshalom, supra note 12. 
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E-commerce Taxation  (“Transforming the Internet”);58 Designing Tax Policy 
for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws  (“Digital 
Biosphere”);59 One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border 
Tax Arbitrage (“One Nation”);60 What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: 
International Tax and the Nation-State (“The Sovereignty Debate”);61 and The 
Bermuda Reinsurance ‘Loophole’: A Case Study of Tax Shelter and Tax 
Havens in the Globalizing Economy (“The Bermuda Loophole”).62  Most of 
these case studies are principally descriptive or illustrative in nature, and most 
appear to undertake the description because the case is viewed as a historically 
important event or phenomenon. 
Thus, Stages of International Taxation by Professor Ilan Benshalom seems 
to fit the profile of a disciplined configurative case study because its goal is to 
explain a set of rules—known as thin capitalization or earnings-stripping—as a 
historically important sequence of stages in international tax policy.63  The 
author uses the case to “demonstrate[] the problems” of the anti-avoidance 
paradigm.64  The article also uses the case to exemplify the author’s new 
paradigmatic stage theory for understanding the international tax regime.65  
The case of thin capitalization rules thus also may be used as a preliminary 
study to test a new theory, described below as a plausibility probe.66 
Similarly, Transforming the Internet and Digital Biosphere, both by 
Professor Arthur Cockfield, undertake case studies to use established 
international tax theory to explain the complications created by e-commerce.67  
The cases are different in kind: in Transforming the Internet, the case is a draft 
proposal on e-commerce taxation by an OECD working party,68 while in 
Digital Biosphere, the case involves tax planning efforts by Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. to reduce sales tax burdens on its online business.69  However, both case 
studies share the goal of explaining how established international tax theory 
 
 58. See Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12. 
 59. See Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12. 
 60. See Ring, One Nation, supra note 12. 
 61. See Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12. 
 62. See Seessel, supra note 12. 
 63. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 636 (“Part VI uses the [earnings-stripping rules] as a case-
study to assess critically whether the anti-avoidance paradigm met any of its feasible 
objectives.”). 
 64. Id. at 676. 
 65. Id. at 636 (arguing that the failure of the earnings-stripping rules “is directly derived 
from the tottery foundations of the Anti-Avoidance Phase and, as such, is reflective of a more 
profound systemic failure in the [international income tax regime]”). 
 66. See infra notes 103–17 and accompanying text. 
 67. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 333; Cockfield, Transforming the 
Internet, supra note 12, at 1174–75. 
 68. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1187–92. 
 69. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 336. 
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fails in the context of e-commerce because the established theory involves 
assumptions about the nature of goods that are fundamentally incompatible 
with the nature of modern commercial practices.70 
One Nation and The Sovereignty Debate, both by Diane Ring, are also 
disciplined configurative case studies.71  In One Nation, Ring uses established 
international tax theories to explain the existence of four case studies of 
various tax arbitrage techniques.72  The article explains that these four cases 
may not necessarily be intrinsically important, but that they exemplify the 
character of international tax phenomena.73  Ring then analyzes the four cases 
from the perspective of conventional international tax policy theory, on the 
basis of efficiency, equity, and revenue impact.74 
Finally, The Bermuda Loophole also seems to fit the profile of a 
disciplined configurative case study.75  This article seeks to show how 
established international tax theory about what constitutes economic substance 
in tax transactions caused the United States legislature to adopt a set of legal 
rules specific to insurance companies, thereby allowing the proliferation of a 
certain type of tax shelter.76  The article does not address explicitly the 
question of whether the case in question—“the process whereby Bermuda 
property and casualty insurance companies avoid U.S. taxation”77—is 
considered a historically important or an exemplary case. 
The common theme of these six articles is that their use of case studies 
might be characterized as an extension of, or a variation on, what we might 
consider a standard approach to tax law scholarship—namely, the use of 
specific examples to demonstrate or prove a point.  The examples are drawn 
from the statutes, regulations, treaties, court cases, and other materials that 
 
 70. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 385 (concluding that the case study 
shows “how traditional tax laws that emphasize control over geographic space fail to achieve the 
appropriate balance within the digital biosphere”); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra 
note 12, at 1175–76 (“The purpose of the case study is to demonstrate how the virtual world can 
subvert legal rules that rely on traditional tax principles that govern physical space.”). 
 71. See Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 90; Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at 
159. 
 72. Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 90. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 90, 101.  The article also explores the impact of these arbitrage techniques on a less 
conventional theory of political accountability, but acknowledges this analysis may be part of the 
traditional efficiency/equity analysis.  Id. at 101. 
 75. See generally Seessel, supra note 12 (discussing the Bermuda loophole, its cause, and 
potential solutions).  This article does not explicitly discuss its goals in undertaking the case 
study, nor does it assess whether the studied case provides insights or draws conclusions. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 543. 
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constitute the primary sources in tax law scholarship.78  The use of the term 
“case study” might be merely a signal that the author intends to make a more 
convincing case than that which may be achieved with a simple recitation of 
examples.79  However, the reason to use a case study appears to be more than 
simply fleshing out an example more concretely.80  As one author explained, “I 
would say that people use the term ‘case study’ deliberately, as opposed to 
‘example.’  I think it means something different than ‘example,’ and we know 
it means something different than ‘example.’ . . . It is not merely descriptive.  
It cannot stand alone.”81 
Disciplined configurative cases may be most prevalent in international tax 
law scholarship, because a primary goal of this kind of case study is to explain 
why an event occurred or a phenomenon exists.82  Explaining phenomena—
especially in relation to how international tax law actually works—is 
something international tax scholars spend a lot of time working on.83  This is 
probably because the system of international tax law is widely viewed as 
enormously complex, multifaceted, and even incoherent.84  In-depth study of 
specific events or phenomena may be the best means of translating the abstract 
construction of international tax theory into a coherent discussion.  
Documenting what actually happens as a result of international tax rules may 
be an effective way to lend credibility to a policy argument advanced in the 
context of such complexity, or to highlight areas needing theory 
development.85 
 
 78. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 12 (examining treaties); Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, 
supra note 12, at 334 (examining a statute); Dean, supra note 12 (evaluating regulations); 
Seessel, supra note 12, at 548 (examining a court case). 
 79. One author suggests that the term signals intellectual credentials that may or may not be 
justified from the methodological approach.  Interview with Steven A. Dean, supra note 39 (“I 
think the real reason to use ‘case study’ is it sounds fancier than ‘example.’  It lends academic 
credence, and it’s pretentious.”). 
 80. In the words of one author, a case study is “the opposite of traditional doctrinal research, 
which is to say let’s look at a bunch of cases, find the common theme, and explain why that has 
become the law.”  Interview with Adam H. Rosenzweig, Assoc. Professor of Law, Wash. Univ. 
Sch. of Law, in Portland, Or. (Mar. 31, 2010) (on file with author). 
 81. Telephone Interview with Diane M. Ring, Professor of Law, Bos. Coll. Law Sch. (Feb. 
23, 2010) (on file with author). 
 82. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75. 
 83. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 12, at 643; Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, 
at 333–34. 
 84. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 1, at 264; see generally Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence 
of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (discussing the history and 
development of the current international taxation system). 
 85. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 99.  In this way, disciplined configurative cases may serve 
heuristic purposes as well.  See infra notes 118–29 and accompanying text. 
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B. Theory-Testing Cases: Assessing the Validity of Existing Theories 
After the disciplined configurative case studies, the second most common 
type of case study observed in the international tax law scholarship fits the 
profile of “theory-testing case studies.”  In the social science literature, theory-
testing case studies are typically described as deductive: The study begins with 
an established theory and tries to assess its validity by presenting test cases.86  
The test cases may be chosen because they seem likely to prove the theory but 
fail to do so, or because they seem likely to disprove the theory but do not do 
so.87  Inductive theory-testing is also possible: study of a case may reveal 
information that allows a theory to emerge.  Three of the international tax law 
case studies appear to employ a theory-testing approach: Internet Taxation & 
Burkina Faso: A Case Study (“Internet Taxation”),88 Tax Treaties for 
Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study (“Tax Treaties for 
Investment and Aid”),89 and Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the 
Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification (“Attractive 
Complexity”).90 
Each article is primarily deductive in nature, using cases to explore the 
validity of an existing theory.  However, the articles include some inductive 
approaches.  Internet Taxation addresses the theory that a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) ban on e-commerce taxation will hurt developing 
countries by examining the impact of the WTO ban on one developing country, 
Burkina Faso.91  Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid addresses the theory that 
tax treaties will improve investment flows between developed and developing 
countries by examining the likely impact of a tax treaty if concluded between 
the United States and one developing country, Ghana.92  Attractive Complexity 
addresses the theory that taxpayers abhor complexity in the tax code by 
examining the development of rules for classifying entities according to type 
for tax purposes.93 
Each of these case studies suggests that the established theory does not 
hold when applied to the given case.  In each article, the case is a vehicle both 
for demonstrating that the given theory is insupportable in the context of given 
facts and for advancing an alternative theory.  Thus, in Internet Taxation, the 
 
 86. See GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75. 
 87. That is, they are “crucial cases.”  See, infra text accompanying notes 153–63, for a 
discussion of these terms in connection with the reasons for choosing a specific case for study. 
 88. Budnick, supra note 12. 
 89. Christians, supra note 12. 
 90. Dean, supra note 12.  This article also appears to exemplify two other types of case 
studies, namely, plausibility probes and heuristic cases.  See infra notes 103–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 91. Budnick, supra note 12, at 553–54. 
 92. Christians, supra note 12, at 643. 
 93. Dean, supra note 12, at 466–67. 
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case is offered both to show that developing countries will not necessarily be 
adversely affected by the WTO ban on internet taxation and to suggest the 
validity of an alternative theory, namely that the WTO ban is generally neutral 
with respect to its effect on the tax revenues of developing countries.94  
Similarly, in Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid, the case is offered both to 
show that developing countries will not necessarily be aided by the existence 
of tax treaties with developed countries and to suggest the validity of the 
alternative theory, that tax treaties between developing and developed 
countries are largely symbolic.95  Finally, in Attractive Complexity, the case is 
offered both to show that taxpayers do not consistently abhor complexity and 
to suggest the validity of the alternative theory, that taxpayers express an 
abhorrence of complexity when they wish to convey an abhorrence of 
regulation.96 
Positing the failure of one theory and suggesting the validity of another is 
not the only function of these theory-testing international tax law case studies, 
however.  Each of these three case studies also suggests that recognizing that 
the established theory has failed can or should impact policy-making going 
forward.97  Thus, the purpose for testing the theory is not limited to disproving 
one theory or advancing another, but also quite explicitly to suggest that the 
knowledge of the failure of the theory should prompt responsive reaction from 
tax lawmakers.  Internet Taxation argues that since the case study suggests the 
WTO ban should be seen as neutral with respect to Burkina Faso, the ban 
should “remain in place as presently formulated,” opposing proposals to lift 
it.98  Similarly, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid suggests that based on the 
strength of the case study involving Ghana, policymakers should approach tax 
treaties between developing and developed countries with a high degree of 
skepticism, despite the overwhelming support for such treaties.99  Finally, 
Attractive Complexity states that based on the strength of the story of how 
entity classification rules developed, policymakers should be critical of 
taxpayer calls for simplicity in international tax law, contradicting the accepted 
wisdom that simplicity is a normatively valid tax policy goal.100 
 
 94. Budnick, supra note 12, at 569. 
 95. Christians, supra note 12, at 644. 
 96. Dean, supra note 12, at 466–67. 
 97. Budnick, supra note 12, at 569; Christians, supra note 12, at 712–13; Dean, supra note 
12, at 467. 
 98. Budnick, supra note 12, at 569. 
 99. Christians, supra note 12, at 712–13 (“[E]very potential tax treaty relationship with 
[Less Developed Countries] should be approached critically. . . . [I]t should not be pursued . . . in 
a myopic adherence to traditional notions . . . .”). 
 100. Dean, supra note 12, at 467 (“Recognizing that rational taxpayers will sometimes prefer 
complexity over simplicity will help prevent attractive complexity from undermining the success 
of efforts to simplify the tax law.”). 
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In this way, the theory-testing international tax case studies are similar to 
their disciplined configurative counterparts: In both types of case studies, legal 
scholars tend to use the case study to advance a policy position.  This should 
not be surprising given the general advocacy nature of legal scholarship.101  As 
such, thinking about these case studies from the perspective of scientific 
approaches to building knowledge may help legal scholars to be more explicit 
about what they are trying to accomplish.  None of the three case studies here 
identified as theory-testing describes itself as such, and thus, none explicitly 
addresses the question of whether and why the chosen case is suitable for 
disproving the posited theory, or how much confidence the reader can have in 
the policy prescription.  International tax scholarship, and in turn international 
tax policy discourse, could be served by answering this question more 
systematically.102 
C. Plausibility Probes: Testing a New Theory 
Like theory-testing case studies, plausibility probes set out to test a theory.  
However, in the case of plausibility probes, the selected theory is new or 
relatively untested rather than established.103  In the social science context, the 
case is used to demonstrate that the new or untested theory deserves additional 
testing.104  Translated to international tax law scholarship, where “testing” is a 
fairly unfamiliar endeavor, a plausibility probing case study might be designed 
to show that the new or untested theory should be applied to other contexts to 
determine if it seems accurate or holds true across cases.105  In the international 
tax case study literature, two articles seem primarily designed as plausibility 
probes: International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications (“International 
Tax Relations”)106 and Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage 
(“Harnessing Tax Arbitrage”).107 
International Tax Relations begins with the conventional view that the 
international tax regime is incoherent and argues that regime theory from the 
discipline of international relations should be applied to bring “coherence and 
organization” to the field.108  The article suggests that international tax scholars 
have a difficult time conceptualizing and theorizing international tax because 
 
 101. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 3, at 399. 
 102. Perhaps the most interesting and significant aspect of these cases, however, is that while 
their theory testing appears from its final presentation in written form to have been conducted 
deductively, the authors developed their theories through empirical study of the cases.  See 
discussion infra, Part III. 
 103. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 152–53. 
 106. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3. 
 107. Rosenzweig, supra note 12. 
 108. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 151. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
348 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:331 
they are not using relevant tools from the discipline of international relations, 
where scholars’ central questions concern relationships between countries.109  
The article uses the international income tax treaty regime “to assess regime 
theory as an explanatory model” of the failure of conventional international tax 
theory to answer some fundamental questions about the structure and 
implications of existing international tax rules.110  The purpose of the case 
study is to test whether regime theory provides explanations that are different 
from those obtainable through conventional theoretical approaches. 
A similar yet distinct purpose and approach is evident in Harnessing Tax 
Arbitrage.111  This article begins with the conventional theory that current 
international tax rules are incapable of preventing international tax arbitrage.112  
The case, the same entity classification rules that formed the case study in 
Attractive Complexity discussed above, is provided in this article to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the approach to arbitrage under existing 
international tax theory.113  Unlike International Tax Relations, which suggests 
that existing international tax theory fails to understand the nature and 
character of its own regime,114 Harnessing Tax Arbitrage does not argue that 
the existing theory is faulty in its understanding of the issue of arbitrage.  
Rather, Harnessing Tax Arbitrage argues that conventional international tax 
theory is capable of identifying, but simply fails to address, the given 
problem.115  The purpose of using the case is both to demonstrate that the 
existing international tax rules will not curb the identified problem, and to 
propose an alternative substantive solution.  The case study thus does not 
challenge existing international tax theory as such, but tests the author’s 
suggested new approach to solving the identified problem. 
In this way, Harnessing Tax Arbitrage is similar to much tax law 
scholarship and much legal scholarship in general.  Its purpose is to serve as a 
testing ground for a proposed substantive law change, much like a set of facts 
(real or hypothetical) might be used to test the validity of a proposed statutory 
revision or a proposed judicial balancing test.  Yet, as in the case of the 
disciplined configurative cases discussed above, the use of the case study 
appears distinctive from the conventional approach to international tax legal 
 
 109. Id. at 84–85; Interview with Diane M. Ring, supra note 81 (“I did believe that IR theory 
is relevant, the idea of trying to understand how governments and other forces at the international 
level interact with each other, and including a subset of actions that might result in regimes, has 
to be relevant [to the study of the international tax regime] because this is the body of literature 
that asks questions about those relationships.”). 
 110. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 114. 
 111. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 558. 
 112. Id. at 557. 
 113. Id. at 620. 
 114. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 84–85. 
 115. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 558. 
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scholarship.  The author has reasons for closely studying a particular set of 
rules, rather than a hypothetical fact pattern or a mere “example,” to test a 
proposed substantive doctrinal approach.  Explicitly addressing these reasons 
in the scholarship may help the reader assess the value of the proposed 
approach.  Thus, with respect to International Tax Relations, Professor Ring 
suggests that her decision to use case studies to explore the validity of a regime 
theory approach to international taxation was motivated by the desire to 
contextualize the abstraction of a new idea—international relations theory—to 
a known audience, i.e., international tax scholars.116  The case studies provided 
a way to use known and important issues to show scholars in the field that the 
new theoretical approach was relevant, meaningful, and one the readers could 
readily absorb.117 
D. Heuristic Cases: Identifying New Variables or Theories 
The final category of theory-developing case studies in international tax 
law scholarship is that of heuristic case studies.  Heuristic case studies are 
described as those that “inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal 
mechanisms, and causal paths.”118  As discussed above in the context of 
disciplined configurative case studies, heuristic case studies may be undertaken 
for the purpose of showing that existing theories inadequately explain observed 
phenomena.119  The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles appears to be the sole 
international tax law case study to exemplify the heuristic approach to case 
studies.120  The primary contribution of this article is to introduce new 
variables by producing a narrative that includes several historical events and 
contextual phenomena that have not been described or illustrated elsewhere in 
the tax literature.  The authors then use these events and phenomena to 
introduce new theories to the tax literature regarding the historical role tax 
havens played as financial markets became increasingly globalized, especially 
during World War II.121 
It seems clear that the goal of The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles is to 
make an in-depth, historically-grounded exploration of one country’s 
experiences in order to show that existing theories about tax havens are 
inadequately conceptualized and contextualized and, therefore, inadequately 
 
 116. Interview with Diane M. Ring, supra note 81. 
 117. Id. 
 118. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 441–47.  Attractive Complexity, discussed above 
in Part II.B, also serves heuristic purposes by impugning an established theory about the 
desirability of simplification, thereby highlighting the need for a new theory.  Dean, supra note 
12, at 467.  However, as discussed above, the principal goal of that case study appears to be 
theory-testing in nature.  See supra notes 90–102. 
 121. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 391–96. 
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theorized.122  In much of the literature about tax havens, scholars 
conventionally suggest that countries deliberately employ certain tax law and 
related regulatory strategies for the sole purpose of gaming the international 
tax system for financial advantage at the expense of rich, capital-exporting 
countries like the United States.123  In contrast, The Saga of the Netherlands 
Antilles states that its goal is to use the experience of the Netherlands Antilles 
“as a lens through which to examine [how] onshore [legal systems] and the 
international regulatory climate may affect international financial centers, both 
onshore and offshore.”124  The goal of exploring the Netherlands Antilles is to 
show that there is a heretofore unknown or unacknowledged context that 
explains the legal systems in this country, and that the knowledge of this 
context illuminates deep flaws in the conventional theories surrounding tax 
havens.125 
The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles thus demonstrates a heuristic purpose 
for undertaking a case study: The goal is to introduce a host of new factors to 
the tax literature that must inform any future attempt to consider the role of, 
and international response to, tax havens.126  Tax havens have been an 
enormously popular subject of research in international tax law scholarship, 
but the theorizing has mainly occurred in the absence of the kind of detailed 
context explored in The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles.127  As a heuristic 
case, the history of the Netherlands Antilles as an offshore financial center 
provides both a rich source of context and a reason to pursue alternative 
theories about managing the goals of taxation in a world of financially 
integrated markets. 
As the foregoing typology of case study research design suggests, case 
studies may be used for several different purposes, and the reader may be 
served by knowing the goals of the research.  Unfortunately, it is not always 
clear which purpose the author is pursing in the studies discussed above.  One 
way in which the social science literature might prove helpful to legal scholars 
 
 122. See id. at 451. 
 123. See generally Adam Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010) (reviewing the literature on tax havens) (on file with author). 
 124. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383. 
 125. Id. at 426–27. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Some examples of international tax articles on international tax include: Hugh J. Ault, 
The Importance of International Cooperation in Forging Tax Policy, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1693 
(2001); Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 81 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99 
(2009); Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax 
Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (2007); Lorraine 
Eden & Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens: Renegade States in the International Tax Regime?, 27 
LAW & POL’Y 100 (2005); Papali’i T. Scanlan, Globalisation and Tax-related Issues: What are 
the Concerns?, in INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: GLOBALISATION AND FISCAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 43 (Rajiv Biswas ed., 2002). 
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is simply to impose some discipline with respect to the description of research 
goals.128  These disciplines developed typologies of research purposes in order 
to be systemic about gathering and assessing data such that scholars and their 
readers could be more confident about the claims made with respect to the 
outcomes of the research.129 
The typologies serve as a guide—not necessarily binding, but useful as a 
starting point—for being more explicit about the goals sought to be 
accomplished by using case studies instead of or in addition to the standard 
approaches to legal scholarship.130  Using the social science literature might 
help legal scholars explain their scholarly goals more explicitly and give the 
reader a better sense of the reasons the author chose a case study over other 
means of making a scholarly point.  Once readers understand why the author 
has chosen a case study in the first place, they may better critique the fit 
between the case and the stated objective. 
III.  CHOOSING THE CASE: WHY THIS CASE? 
Once the author has determined to study a case in order to develop 
international tax law theory, the author must choose “the” case to be studied.  
Again, with reference to the social science literature, specific cases may be 
studied because they serve specific research purposes.  Four general categories 
of cases described in the social science literature seem most suited to 
describing the international tax case studies: 1) representative cases—a typical 
or standard example of a wider category;131 2) atypical or “deviant cases”—
those that deviate from the expected;132 3) crucial cases—either those 
considered most likely to demonstrate a given theory that do not, or those 
considered least likely to support a theory that do, in fact, support the theory;133 
and 4) archetypal cases—defining cases, in the sense that the case studied 
became a model that influenced subsequent cases of the same type.134  Each of 
these types of cases is described in the context of the international tax case 
studies below. 
 
 128. Livingston, supra note 3, at 415. 
 129. Id. at 368. 
 130. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 103 (“Aiming at the disciplined application of theories to cases 
forces one to state theories more rigorously than might otherwise be done.”). 
 131. Isidora Djurić et al., Letter to Editor, The Role of Case Study Method in Management 
Research, 5 SERBIAN J. MGMT. 175, 177 (2010). 
 132. See, e.g., Ali Kazancigil, The Deviant Case in Comparative Analysis: High Stateness in 
a Muslim Society: The Case of Turkey, in COMPARING NATIONS: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, 
SUBSTANCE 213–14 (Mattei Dogan & Ali Kazancigil eds., 1994). 
 133. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 118. 
 134. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 178. 
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A. Representative Cases 
Most of the international tax law case studies may be viewed as 
representative in nature, although only Stages of International Taxation states 
explicitly that the case was chosen because it represents events or phenomena 
of the general kind being studied.135  The author states that he chose to study 
the use by multinational corporations of thin-capitalization/earnings-stripping 
techniques because these techniques are “the best representative example” of 
the problems of attempts by governments to separate abusive tax-motivated 
transactions from ordinary business transactions.136  In making the case that the 
international tax regime created an unworkable anti-avoidance paradigm, 
Stages of International Taxation uses the case of the earnings-stripping rules as 
a typical strategy employed by governments to prevent taxpayers from 
engaging in excessive tax avoidance.137 
None of the other case studies examined explicitly characterizes the nature 
of the case studied, but six, in addition to Stages of International Taxation, 
appear to be representative.  These are Internet Taxation,138 Digital 
Biosphere,139 One Nation,140 International Tax Relations,141 The Sovereignty 
Debate,142 and The Bermuda Loophole.143  Each of these articles implies that 
the studied subject is one of a class of like subjects, often (but not always) by 
referring to or directly providing some empirically observable evidence of 
likeness.  For example, in Internet Taxation, the author suggests that Burkina 
Faso is representative of other developing countries because its “economy and 
policies mirror that of similarly situated countries.”144  In Digital Biosphere, 
the author implies that the subject of its case study, Wal-Mart, might be 
representative of a class by stating that “there are many more click-and-mortars 
that are attempting to use similar entity isolation strategies.”145  In The 
Bermuda Loophole, the author suggests that Bermuda is one of a class of “tax-
efficient jurisdictions” by suggesting that if rules were changed with respect to 
 
 135. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 676. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 674. 
 138. Budnick, supra note 12. 
 139. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12. 
 140. Ring, One Nation, supra note 12. 
 141. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3. 
 142. Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12. 
 143. Seessel, supra note 12. 
 144. Budnick, supra note 12, at 556.  I make the same suggestion in Taxation for Investment 
and Aid, but, for the reasons discussed below, I characterize Ghana as a “crucial case.”  
Christians, supra note 12, at 712; see infra notes 153–63 and accompanying text. 
 145. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 373. 
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Bermuda, taxpayers would simply move their money to an alternate 
jurisdiction in the class.146 
Each of these statements suggest that—for the purpose of developing this 
kind of case study—the fact that empirical evidence could presumably be 
marshaled to demonstrate the purported like class is sufficient to support the 
proposition that the case studied is worthy of study because it represents a 
larger body of like cases.  The authors assume that the case is relevant for 
studying the asserted phenomenon based on a claim that there are other cases 
like this one out there—which we presumably do not need to study since we 
are studying this one.  The prospect of selection bias discussed above147 
appears to be most problematic in this context, since we do not have studies of 
the other cases of which the instant case is representative.  Describing 
qualitatively whether and why we think our cases are representative might help 
us assess the credibility of the claims and proposals we make.  In other words, 
the qualitative approach that forces us to confront the assumptions underlying 
our articulation of cases in international tax scholarship might also help us to 
contextualize our specific case more effectively. 
B. Atypical or Deviant Cases 
In contrast to representative cases, a scholar pursues atypical or deviant 
cases to illuminate the exceptional.148  Atypical cases ask why something that 
was expected to happen did not happen.149  Just one of the international tax 
case studies appears to typify a deviant case study, namely Attractive 
Complexity.  The article is not explicit in this characterization, but describes a 
situation involving international tax rule formation in which if a stated theory 
were true, a certain result should have occurred, but did not.150  Finding that 
the expected result did not occur, the author states that an alternative theory 
must be developed to explain the events that occurred in contravention of the 
 
 146. Seessel, supra note 12, at 568 (“[E]ven if the Treasury or Congress closes the loophole 
with respect to Bermuda, the reinsurance business would shift to other tax efficient jurisdictions 
. . . .”). 
 147. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 148. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 7, at 75. 
 149. Odell, supra note 8, at 166 (“When a body of theory is fairly well developed and 
substantial evidence has confirmed it, a detailed study of a deviant case can be illuminating. . . . 
An anomaly sometimes can suggest new hypotheses that also account for cases previously 
thought accounted for.”). 
 150. Dean, supra note 12, at 407 (“If it were true that the tax law’s ever-increasing 
complexity was merely a product of political failure, the check-the-box election, by all accounts a 
political success story, should have unambiguously diverted public and private resources away 
from the tax law.”). 
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prevailing theory.151  Consistent with atypical cases in general, Attractive 
Complexity uses the atypical case of the formation of the entity classification 
rules to “tidy up our understanding of exceptions and anomalies” or “to 
identify underlying causes.”152 
C. Crucial Cases 
The crucial case study is premised on the idea of showing that a theory 
works even in the least likely conditions or, conversely, does not work even in 
the most likely conditions.153  If a scholar can show a theory works in 
conditions where it should not, it is likely to be valid in all other circumstances 
as well; conversely, a theory that “fails to work even in the most favorable 
conditions can quickly be dismissed.”154  As one example of a “least likely” 
case from the social science literature, a researcher tested his thesis that all 
organizations become dominated by a ruling elite by examining the ruling 
structure of socialist parties.155  His theory was that since socialist parties are 
organizations committed to the norm of internal democracy, it would be very 
unlikely that such an organization would be dominated by a ruling elite.156  If 
oligarchy existed in this “least likely” case (as it did), it would also likely apply 
to other organizations that lacked a democratic culture.157 
On the other hand, the social science literature suggests that “[a] single 
crucial case may certainly score a clean knockout over a theory.”158  I did not 
identify any “least likely” cases in the international tax law literature.  
 
 151. Id. (“Concluding that the check-the-box election failed to produce a clear improvement 
in simplicity and that the tax law’s complexity has not been significantly affected by the public’s 
growing interest in simplification would suggest an alternative explanation of complexity’s 
relentless advance.”). 
 152. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 178; Kazancigil, supra note 132, at 214. 
 153. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 177–78. 
 154. Id. at 178; see also Odell, supra note 8, at 165–67. 
 155. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE 
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., 1915) 
(analyzing the characteristics of political parties during the rise of the nation-state to learn about 
the characteristics individuals seek in political leaders). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 127; 
Probably the closest a single case study can come to approximating a neutral test would 
be when the researcher selects an extreme case that is highly unlikely to confirm, and 
finds that even this case does so.  Such a least-likely case study would provide strong, 
though not unqualified, support for the inference that the theory is even more likely to be 
valid in most other cases, where contrary winds do not blow as strongly. 
Odell, supra note 8, at 165. Others suggest that this conclusion places too much weight on one 
case, and assumes a narrow theory-testing role for case studies that may not be appropriate.  See, 
e.g., GERRING, supra note 31, at 118 (“[N]o single-case test can offer strong confirmation of the 
theory.”). 
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However, one article, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid,159 may typify its 
corollary, the “most likely” case.  In that article, I state that the case study 
involves a country, Ghana, that is a likely candidate for a treaty, and that if a 
treaty between the United States and Ghana would not provide the benefits 
commonly attributed to tax treaties, then the theory that tax treaties provide 
such benefits must not hold.160  The aim of the case study is to question the 
validity of the theory that tax treaties can have a positive impact on trade and 
investment.161  Yet, as the social science literature demonstrates, caution 
should be used in determining that the case is, in fact, “most likely” and in 
determining what conclusions can be drawn from the evidence provided by the 
single case.162  The social science literature might suggest that additional cases 
should be identified and studied to increase the certainty that the initial 
conclusion remains plausible.163 
D. Archetypal Cases 
Archetypal cases constitute a defining case—that is, something that the 
author argues sets the stage for everything that follows.164  Within the 
international tax literature studied, only The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles is 
an archetypal case.  In that article, the authors suggest that the Netherlands 
Antilles set the stage for “offshore finance.”165  It may be that the Netherlands 
Antilles is now a representative case (i.e., it is one of a certain class of 
countries), such that studying the Netherlands Antilles may give us insight into 
how these other countries operate.  We might want to suggest, for example, 
that the Netherlands Antilles is like other “tax havens” or other “offshore 
finance centers.”  As discussed above, such a claim would be more credible to 
the extent we could offer more empirical description of the relevant 
characteristics.  Indeed, as various efforts to curb international tax evasion 
have illustrated, defining the term “tax haven” has required extensive attention 
 
 159. Christians, supra note 12. 
 160. Id. at 644. 
 161. Id. 
This case study demonstrates that in today’s global tax climate, a typical tax treaty would 
not provide significant tax benefits to current or potential investors. . . . [and that] much of 
the conventional wisdom about the impact of tax treaties on the global flow of investment 
does not apply in the context of many of the LDCs most in need of realizing the benefits 
attributed to these agreements. 
Id. at 644, 712. 
 162. See, e.g., Odell, supra note 8, at 172 (pointing out the potential short-comings of the 
single-case approach). 
 163. See id. (implying that additional cases will strengthen a conclusion). 
 164. Djurić et al., supra note 131, at 178; see also WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL 
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 109 (2003). 
 165. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383. 
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to (and suffered from the lack of) qualitative empirical evidence.166  But The 
Saga of the Netherlands Antilles does not necessarily direct us to examine this 
problem.  Rather, the point of this archetypal case seems to be that, but for the 
specific historical developments in the Netherlands Antilles, the phenomenon 
we now identify as “offshore finance” would not exist in its current form.167  
As a result, the history of this particular country is presented as intrinsically 
interesting, as well as significantly impacting succeeding events. 
Categorizing cases into social science types is informative as well as 
cautionary.  The fact that most of the cases fit into a few categories might 
reveal some key assumptions legal scholars make about the nature of 
knowledge and what is needed to convince an audience that a claim or 
proposition ought to be viewed as worthy of attention—if not deference—in 
future decision-making.  We may view our generally light documentation of 
the ways in which the chosen case is like or unlike other cases, compared to 
our relatively more thorough documentation of the substance of the cases 
themselves, as illustrative of what legal scholars perceive as important to the 
function of legal scholarship. 
The caution is that failing to think about our cases in terms of what they 
are a case of may lead us—both authors and readers of international tax 
scholarship—to make assumptions and draw conclusions that will not 
withstand, and may even be contradicted by, the cold light of implementation 
in the understudied context.  If we are more reflective about the universe of 
possible cases and contexts, we may be more deliberate in our approach to the 
case and in our assessment of what we find.  Categorizing our case studies 
within a social science framework provides a means of thinking about why we 
are undertaking cases in the first place.  But it also forces us to consider more 
carefully how we ought to make the case. 
IV.  BUILDING THE CASE: METHODS AND SOURCES 
How do international tax law scholars approach their cases?  None of the 
international tax case studies includes a description of the author’s reasoning 
regarding how the case is or should be constructed.  Instead, the case studies 
evidence an approach that is common to tax law scholarship: Narratives are 
built by gathering and analyzing relevant facts and authoritative legal 
doctrines.168  Much of the narrative is drawn from what might be described as 
standard sources of tax-related legal research and the standard approaches to 
legal argumentation—“standard” because they are the prevailing sources and 
 
 166. See Christians, supra note 127, at 122–24. 
 167. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383 (stating that this case is “an important 
contribution given the historic role played by the island’s financial sector in the overall 
development of offshore finance”). 
 168. See Livingston, supra note 3, at 374–75. 
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approaches used in tax law scholarship.169  In the context of the international 
tax case studies, both the litany of sources and the approach to analysis reflect 
decisions that the authors made regarding what they believed was needed to 
“make the case.”170 
Accordingly, international tax case study authors use all of the primary 
source materials that are familiar to tax law scholars in general, including tax 
and other statutes,171 tax treaties,172 and court cases,173 as well as Treasury and 
agency guidance,174 legislative history,175 and other congressional and 
executive materials.176  They also use the standard secondary sources 
commonly employed in constructing tax law scholarship, such as other law 
review and journal articles,177 tax trade publication articles,178 scholarly and 
popular books,179 newspaper and other media accounts,180 and other guidance 
 
 169. Id. at 376–78. 
 170. See, e.g., Interview with Diane M. Ring, supra note 81.  The approach to case study 
research is “almost self-evident,” and implied by the kind of case the author wishes to make: “I 
wanted to do something that’s not vague or insufficiently concrete to persuade, something that the 
reader could envision.”  Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 639 n.12, 640 n.16 (citing Internal Revenue Code 
provisions and other United States statutes); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, 
at 1176 n.15, 1178 n.16 (citing Internal Revenue Code provisions and other United States 
statutes). 
 172. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 12, at 640–41 n.4 (citing United States tax treaties with 
Barbados, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela); Cockfield, Transforming the 
Internet, supra note 12, at 1187 n.50 (citing a U.S.-India tax treaty). 
 173. See, e.g., Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1201 n.104 (citing a 
United States Supreme Court case). 
 174. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 682 n.165 (citing the United States Treasury 
1996 Model Income Tax Convention); Christians, supra note 12, at 647 n.22 (citing a Treasury 
press release); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1178 n.17 (citing the 
United States Treasury 1996 Model Income Tax Convention). 
 175. See, e.g., Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1201 n.106 (citing a 
Congressional bill). 
 176. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 693 n.211 (citing Joint Committee on Taxation 
publications); Budnick, supra note 12, at 556 n.52 (citing U.S. CIA World Factbook); Christians, 
supra note 12, at 639 n.1 (citing U.S. CIA World Factbook); Cockfield, Transforming the 
Internet, supra note 12, at 1174–75 n.12 (citing the Advisory Commission Report to Congress 
and GAO Report on e-commerce). 
 177. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 633–36 nn.1–7; Budnick, supra note 12, at 552 
n.19; Christians, supra note 12, at 640 n.2; Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, 
at 1173 n.7. 
 178. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 671 n.137 (citing an article in Tax Notes 
International); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1176 n.15 (citing an article 
in Tax Notes). 
 179. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 643 n.23, 645 n.30; Cockfield, Transforming the 
Internet, supra note 12, at 1173 nn.7 & 9. 
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and commentary from institutional sources like the American Law Institute,181 
the United Nations,182 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.183 
International tax case study authors also employ the kinds of approaches 
that are common in the tax law literature—namely, persuasion via thorough, 
extensive documentation.  Thus, much of the international tax case study 
scholarship, like much other tax law scholarship, is designed to illustrate, 
demonstrate, or prove the accuracy of the author’s perspective on how tax 
rules, regimes, or practices operate or should operate.184  Similarly, much of 
the international tax case study scholarship, like much other tax law 
scholarship, makes the case for a proposed change of rules185 or for adopting 
the author’s view of an event or phenomenon.186  Scholars accomplish these 
objectives by producing relevant facts and doctrines, explaining why these 
facts and doctrines are relevant and important and how they fit together, and 
making persuasive statements about why their narrative compels the reader to 
draw certain conclusions. 
 
 180. See, e.g., Budnick, supra note 12, at 549 n.2, 550 n.3 (citing an Internet news story and 
an African news media account); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1172 
nn.1, 2 & 5, 1186 n.47 (citing Time magazine, an Internet news story, an Associated Press story, 
and The Economist). 
 181. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 659 n.85 (citing an ALI Tax Advisory Group 
draft proposal). 
 182. See, e.g., Budnick, supra note 12, at 550 n.9 (citing an UNCTAD report); Cockfield, 
Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1186 n.49 (citing the U.N. Model Tax Treaty). 
 183. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 12, at 664 n.103, 674–75 n.147; Budnick, supra note 
12, at 557 n.57; Christians, supra note 12, at 647 n.21; Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, 
supra note 12, at 1174 n.10, 1175 n.13. 
 184. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 686–87 (demonstrating the inadequacies of the anti-
avoidance paradigm); Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383 (showing how the “onshore” legal 
systems and “the international regulatory climate may affect other international financial centers, 
both onshore and offshore”); Budnick, supra note 12, at 579–80 (showing how e-commerce tax 
rules impact developing countries); Christians, supra note 12, at 712 (discussing why there are 
few tax treaties between the United States and developing countries); Cockfield, Digital 
Biosphere, supra note 12, at 403 (showing how traditional tax laws are ill-equipped to deal with 
e-commerce practices); Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1175 (showing 
how regulators developed e-commerce tax rules “while striving to preserve existing international 
tax principles”); Ring, One Nation, supra note 12, at 79 (showing how tax arbitrage works); Ring, 
Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at 159 (showing how individuals use the concept of 
sovereignty to advance different policy positions in tax); Seessel, supra note 12, at 542–43 
(illustrating how income is tax sheltered through tax havens). 
 185. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 629–30 (arguing adoption of his proposed treatment for 
arbitrage). 
 186. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 634 (arguing for his view of stages of development of 
international tax theory); Dean, supra note 12, at 467 (arguing for his view of taxpayer attitudes 
about simplicity); Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 153–54 (arguing for her 
view of the coherence of the international tax system as a regime). 
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However, many of the international tax case studies also employed 
approaches and used sources that differ from these traditional standards, 
reflecting a more qualitative research instinct.  These approaches include both 
gathering non-standard source material and analyzing standard source 
materials in non-standard ways.  For example, three of the case studies are 
expressly constructed using information gathered through personal interviews 
with individual legal practitioners, judges, government officials, and other 
relevant parties.187  It is not uncommon for tax scholars to cite a single 
interview or an e-mail correspondence for a particular proposition, but 
extensive qualitative interviewing is a rarity in international tax law 
scholarship.188 
Other scholars similarly engaged in some form of qualitative interviewing, 
but did not document this data when constructing their cases.  That is, at least 
some of the authors spoke to one or more individuals with personal experience 
and knowledge on the subject of the study, and whom the authors perceived to 
be credible sources of information.189  These authors—perhaps like many legal 
scholars—used their discussions with these individuals to better understand the 
studied subject or to construct theories about the studied subject, but they did 
not cite to the primary source of data—namely, notes from interviews or e-mail 
correspondence. 
In addition to qualitative interviewing, many of the case studies used social 
science approaches to examine standard source material in ways that may be 
considered unconventional in international tax law scholarship.  One study 
used recorded statements of key government officials and commentators, a 
common source of citation in international tax law scholarship, but used the 
comments in a non-standard way—namely, by engaging in rhetorical analysis 
of these sources.190  Another study used information found in company filings 
as a primary source material, a relatively less common source of citation in tax 
law scholarship.191 
 
 187. See, e.g., Boise & Morris, supra note 16 (using data from thirteen referenced 
interviews); Christians, supra note 12 (using data from seven referenced interviews); Cockfield, 
Transforming the Internet, supra note 12 (using data from one referenced interview). 
 188. The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles and Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid are the 
sole instances of international tax law scholarship constructed through qualitative interviewing of 
which I am aware. 
 189. Interview with Steven A. Dean, supra note 39 (stating he consulted with law firm partner 
knowledgeable on the check-the-box regime); Telephone Interview with Ben Seessel (Mar. 19, 
2010) (on file with author) (stating he spoke to former law firm partner with knowledge on the 
general area of law). 
 190. See, e.g., Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 12, at 187–89. 
 191. See Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12, at 1181 n.29 (citing interview 
with company vice president of legal affairs), 1180 nn.26–27 (referring to a company’s annual 
SEC reports). 
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Although none of these articles articulated why additional or different 
sources or approaches might be necessary or useful in the research, it seems 
clear that some kind of empirical study allowed the authors to understand 
context and build theory.  Thus, in The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, the 
authors construct a history of the Netherlands Antilles as an offshore financial 
center though the use of some standard legal source material: legislative 
records, scholarly articles, information available on institutional websites, 
industry and interest group reports, media accounts of events, and statements 
by policy commentators at conferences.192  Similarly, in Tax Treaties for 
Investment and Aid, I constructed economic, social, and political attributes of a 
particular country, Ghana, through standard legal source material.193  But in 
each case study, the authors also conducted interviews which they used to help 
construct their narrative. 
The authors employed these interviews for a range of pedagogic purposes.  
First, interview data was used to make assertions about facts, including facts 
that are or could be reinforced with other documented sources.194  The data 
was also used to explain why an event happened historically, often in ways that 
seem to create links that the outsider might not otherwise find significant.195  In 
a few instances, interview data was used to explain what a legal doctrine 
required or prohibited.196  Interview data was also used to describe (positively 
or negatively) political or social contexts of events or states,197 to characterize 
people, places, or events, especially in a narrative or informal format using 
metaphor or analogy,198 and to infer or estimate facts not otherwise 
available.199 
What may not be as clear from the set of the interview data in these case 
studies is the extent to which the interviewing was instrumental in more 
fundamental ways, beyond its usefulness in providing citations to specific 
points.  For example, although it is not obvious from the manner in which the 
 
 192. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 379 n.4. 
 193. Christians, supra note 12, at 640 n.2. 
 194. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 394 nn.102–04, 404 n.75; Christians, supra note 12, 
at 684–85 n.189, 689 n.211, 702 n.270. 
 195. Boise  & Morriss, supra note 16, at 394 n.100, 395 n.104, 411 n.226, 416 n.255, 421 
n.286, 424 n.301, 432 nn.340–41, 434 n.348, 437 n.361. 
 196. Id. at 404 nn.176–77, 422–23 n.296. 
 197. Christians, supra note 12, at 701 n.269. 
 198. Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 394 n.101, 405 (likening a group’s expertise to “three 
donkeys and six dinosaurs”), 406 (describing an event as “like finding gold”), 419 (describing an 
event as “then disaster struck” and a change of circumstances as “a ‘new wind’ was blowing”), 
421 (“[T]he United States is a lot better off without [the Antilles tax treaty].”), 422–23 n.292, 426 
(describing the impact of a legal-doctrine change on a population as ‘“slaughtered’ and 
‘absolutely run over’”), 433–34 (describing the relationship between two countries as “[i]f you 
stand in the ring with Mike Tyson”). 
 199. Id. at 432 n.340. 
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interview data was used in Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid,200 as the 
author of that study, I am aware that I conducted many of my interviews 
primarily to learn about and understand the complicated social and political 
contexts of my subject matter because I believed that my understanding would 
be incomplete if obtained solely through the standard sources of legal 
research.201  My goal was to test what is written about tax issues by learning 
how people who were living and working within the specific context perceived 
these issues from their different perspectives.202 
The common theme of the uses of interview data in these two case studies 
is that the data was evidently instrumental in presenting a narrative about a 
sequence of events, contextualizing known facts, and linking facts for the 
reader.203  What is missing from the literature and what might make the data 
even more compelling, is a discussion about the authors’ objectives, processes, 
and reasoning for collecting and using the data—especially in the case of 
qualitative interviewing.204  In other words, as in the context of determining 
what defines a case and what constitutes a case study, the international tax law 
scholarship might better achieve its objectives by consulting literature on 
epistemology, especially in the social sciences where researchers have 
methodically studied how knowledge may be reliably generated through 
qualitative means such as interviewing.205 
For example, international tax case study scholarship might benefit from 
applying some of the methods social scientists use to test their data to ensure 
the credibility of their assertions.  Perhaps the most useful tool in this area 
would be the concept of triangulation, which in simple terms means scientists 
 
 200. Christians, supra note 12. 
 201. See Stake, supra note 4, at 453 (“What details of life the researchers are unable to see for 
themselves is [sic] obtained by interviewing people who did see them or by finding documents 
recording them.”). 
 202. See Joel Slemrod, Tax Principles in an International Economy, in WORLD TAX REFORM, 
supra note 2, at 11, 13 (“A discussion of tax principles in an international economy must come to 
terms with the real world, where the implementation of certain tax systems, which may be 
desirable in theory, is extremely difficult.”). 
 203. See Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln, Introduction: The Discipline and Practice 
of Qualitative Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1, 19 (“In writing, the field-
worker makes a claim to moral and scientific authority.”). 
 204. See id. at 5 (“Qualitative research is inherently multi-method in focus, . . . a strategy that 
adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry.”). 
 205. See Stake, supra note 4, at 455 (cautioning that “[case researchers] will, like others, pass 
along to readers some of their personal meanings of events and relationships—and fail to pass 
along others.”); see also id. at 456 (“[T]he [case] researcher decides what the case’s ‘own story’ 
is, or at least what will be included in the report.  More will be pursued than was volunteered, and 
less will be reported than was learned.”).  Because it consists in making representations, 
qualitative research cannot overcome the fact that “[o]bjective reality can never be captured.” 
Denzin & Lincoln, supra note 203, at 5. 
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often test the outcomes they derive from one method of research by obtaining 
the same results from another method of research.206  The use of qualitatively-
gathered data by international tax scholars suggests that one of our main ways 
of using this data is to confirm or bolster factual statements which are, or could 
be, available from different sources.  This suggests that international tax 
scholars are already engaging in some effort to triangulate, even if this effort is 
not explicitly stated.207  Being more explicit about that process could improve 
our confidence (and the confidence of our readers) in the conclusions we draw 
from our research.  This is not to say that tax law case studies must look like or 
try to emulate social science case studies in terms of methodology.208  But I do 
suggest that social science discourse on the promises and perils of case studies 
ought to inform the way tax scholars view and present the usefulness of case 
studies in international tax law scholarship. 
Perhaps the most significant observation of this work is how useful a 
qualitative social science approach can be for developing theory.  In most, and 
perhaps all, of the articles studied here, the authors were able to articulate 
theories about international taxation only after gathering some amount of 
empirical data—whether through interviewing or studying texts—and writing 
about the specific case.  For example, Professor Dean had an intrinsic interest 
in the check-the-box regulations which, upon close study of the regulatory 
history underlying the change to the rules, revealed to him the inconsistency of 
articulation regarding simplicity as a valid policy goal for international tax 
law.209  Studying the case provided a rich context for thinking about 
simplification as a rhetorical substitute for very different political goals. 
Similarly, in my own work, I wanted to understand why the United States 
has so few tax treaties with Sub-Saharan African countries despite many other 
trade and aid relationships with these countries.  Only after studying the 
economic and social relationships between the United States and one Sub-
Saharan African country was I emboldened to develop a theory about the 
purely symbolic nature of tax treaties between developed and developing 
countries.  Professors Boise and Morriss clearly developed a theory about the 
 
 206. Laurel Richardson & Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre, Writing: A Method of Inquiry, in THE 
SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 959, 963; Stake, supra note 4, at 453–54 (“To reduce the 
likelihood of misinterpretation, various procedures are employed, two of the most common being 
redundancy of data gathering and procedural challenges to explanations.”). 
 207. One reason for failing to articulate a scholar’s research method is that legal audiences are 
uninterested in these issues.  See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Tax’s Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 75 
(1996) (“I sense that contemporary audiences are easily bored with discussions of pure 
methodology.”). 
 208. See Macaulay, supra note 27, at 1177–82 (discussing ways in which legal scholars can 
use some of the tools of social science without necessarily forcing us to “master social science 
method, enlist good partners, or both”). 
 209. Interview with Steven A. Dean, supra note 39. 
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nature of tax haven evolution by learning from the contemporary and historical 
context.210  Theory develops as knowledge emerges through empirical study of 
social, economic, and political contexts.  We could do a better job of studying 
and understanding these contexts by consulting literature that directly 
addresses the question of how to learn from observation. 
V.  ASSESSING THE CASE 
The final aspect of analyzing the international tax case studies involves the 
assessment of the applicability or explanatory value of the case(s) studied: “[I]t 
is one thing to marshal the facts, and another to know what to make of the 
facts.”211  As in other aspects of the international tax case studies, authors are 
not typically explicit about the criteria they use to assess the pedagogic value 
of their cases.212  Most, however, do draw some substantive conclusions 
specifically from the cases studied.213  Perhaps most problematic from the 
perspective of social science work on the validity of conclusions drawn from 
research, most international tax case studies draw fairly broad conclusions 
without discussing the criteria used to determine whether, and to what extent, 
the observations drawn from the case ought to be viewed as generalizable to 
other cases or to international tax theory in general.214 
An examination of the conclusions international tax scholars draw from 
their case studies suggests that most believe their conclusions are generalizable 
in some way.  Several propose that the case study is generalizable in terms of 
explaining an event or phenomenon.  For example, Stages of International 
Taxation advocates that the conclusions drawn from studying the case of the 
earnings-stripping rules are generalizable to explain failure in the international 
tax law system.215  The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles indicates that the case 
explains both a general phenomenon (offshore finance) and predicts future 
phenomena (the prospects for offshore finance going forward).216  
 
 210.  See Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 383. 
 211. Dennis Patterson, Response, The Limits of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us: Comments 
on Daniel Keating’s “Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action,” 98 MICH. L. REV. 2738, 2738 
(2000). 
 212. Diane Ring is the most explicit.  See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 213. Not all authors do so, however.  Ring, One Nation, supra note 12 (explicitly refusing to 
draw conclusions from the cases she studied). 
 214. This point relates back to the prior discussion on selection bias, supra Part II. 
 215. Benshalom, supra note 12, at 636, 686 (stating that the case “is reflective of a more 
profound systemic failure in the [international income tax regime]” and that the case “is a 
reflection of the anti-avoidance paradigm as a whole”). 
 216. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 16, at 426–27. 
[F]rom the experience of the Antilles one can discern the contours of a theory that 
explains the relatively brief arc of that jurisdiction’s success as an offshore financial 
intermediary and offers insight into the future prospects of both the Antilles and other 
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International Tax Relations suggests the cases studied demonstrate that regime 
theory can help explain the international tax regime.217 
Two of the case studies imply that their cases are generalizable to 
populations other than those studied.  Both Internet Taxation and Tax Treaties 
for Investment and Aid suggest that conclusions drawn from the case studies 
involving one country—Burkina Faso and Ghana, respectively—are 
generalizable to other developing countries.218  Both articles make some 
references to explain why the cases involving these countries ought to be 
viewed as applicable to other, similarly situated countries.219  In Internet 
Taxation, the author suggests that Burkina Faso’s “economy and policies 
mirror that of similarly situated countries.”220  In Tax Treaties for Investment 
 
 
offshore financial centers in the twenty-first century. . . . The rise and fall of the Antilles 
suggests four critical propositions for the offshore financial sector at large. 
Id. at 426–27. 
 217. Ring, International Tax Relations, supra note 3, at 148, 151 (discussing how regime 
theory is an explanatory model for the double tax treaty regime and can bring “coherence and 
organization” to the study of international tax.  “[T]he double taxation case study demonstrates 
how international relations theory and methodology can contribute to our understanding of even 
the most familiar of international tax stories.”).  Ring is most explicit about the value of cases.  Id. 
at 151–52 (“[I]t will be valuable to develop a stable of case studies to help identify common 
issues, patterns, and problems, and to serve as a database for testing various aspects of regime 
theory.”).  More case studies and institutional analysis could help test this theory.  Ring is also 
explicit about the nature of generalizing.  Id. at 153 (“Through analysis of international tax case 
studies, we can identify common themes in the regime experience in international tax that may be 
generalized and may enable us to predict where and when regime formation efforts are likely to 
be successful and how that success can be fostered.”). 
 218. Budnick, supra note 12, at 568 (“[Burkina Faso’s] numbers suggest that developing 
countries will not necessarily be harmed in the future by current international [tax] policy.”).  
Further, Burkina Faso’s loss of tax revenue seems to be based more on its internal choices than as 
a result of the WTO ban on e-commerce taxation.  Id. at 569 (“[T]he present WTO ban should 
remain in place as presently formulated.  Although the ban does result in disproportionate losses 
in percentage terms for developing countries, when placed within the context of a single country, 
these losses appear minimal.”).  “This data [showing minimal losses to Burkina Faso] would 
indicate that not in all situations are developing nations unfairly prejudiced [by the WTO ban, but 
would be] adversely affected by the imposition of residence-based taxation.”  Id. at 579.  See also 
Christians, supra note 12, at 712 (suggesting that the case of Ghana shows tax treaties are not 
generally beneficial for developing countries and that the failure of tax treaties to provide benefits 
explains why few tax treaties between the United States and developing countries exist). 
 219. Here, the question of whether the case is generalizable relates back to the discussion of 
whether the case is representative, discussed in Part III, supra.  Both of these articles claimed that 
their cases were representative, so it seems straightforward to claim the conclusions drawn are 
generalizable to other similar cases. 
 220. Budnick, supra note 12, at 556.  The reasoning seems a bit circular: the case studied 
claimed to be like other cases that are like it.  In terms attributed to Abraham Lincoln, “People 
who like this sort of thing will find this the sort of thing they like.”  GEORGE W.E. RUSSELL, 
COLLECTIONS AND RECOLLECTIONS 309–10 (1898). 
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and Aid, I suggest that the failure of the theory of the beneficial nature of tax 
treaties when applied to Ghana (a “most likely case”) makes it unlikely that tax 
treaties will prove beneficial in cases involving other countries as well.221  The 
social science literature suggests a more careful approach should be taken in 
extrapolating across populations and that international tax law scholarship 
might benefit from this caution. 
Finally, three of the case studies suggest that the case demonstrates that a 
specific tax policy ought to be adopted or continued.  This claim is most 
strongly made in Transforming the Internet,222 Digital Biosphere,223 and 
Harnessing Tax Arbitrage.224  As discussed above in the context of choosing a 
case, the potential issue in drawing policy prescriptions from one or even 
several cases is that there may be means of determining whether and in what 
ways the case might deviate or produce atypical results that might help bolster 
policy claims.225  That is, to the extent that international tax scholars wish to 
use case studies to advance a position on a specific tax policy direction, the 
argument could be stronger if the reader had more confidence in the case used 
to draw the conclusion.226  As in the other areas, international tax scholars 
 
 221. Christians, supra note 12, at 712. 
 222. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet, supra note 12. 
The case study suggests that proposals to tax profits emanating from computer servers 
will not be an effective solution. . . . [The] analysis suggests that a more effective 
regulatory framework is required to govern the taxation of international e-commerce 
transactions. . . . [and] show[s] how the virtual world can subvert regulatory attempts that 
try to replicate real world rules and principles. 
Id. at 1175–76, 1200, 1265. 
 223. Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 12, at 373, 385–86 (suggesting that Wal-Mart’s 
strategy will spread and have a negative effect on state and local government revenues; proposing 
a change in tax policy to avoid this result; and stating that the case study shows “how traditional 
tax laws that emphasize control over geographic space fail to achieve the appropriate balance 
within the digital biosphere” and that the traditional rules “will lead to revenue losses and a 
distortion in the marketplace as companies seek to develop tax-free online affiliates”). 
 224. Rosenzweig, supra note 12, at 629–30.  The case study demonstrates “the distributional 
and cooperative benefits of the approach proposed by this article.”  Id. at 559.  The case study 
also evidences that existing approaches to international tax arbitrage cannot work.  Id. at 558. 
 225. In this aspect, the international tax law scholarship may suffer from some of the same 
problems faced in international legal scholarship more generally.  See Joel P. Trachtman, 
International Economic Law Research: A Taxonomy, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE 
STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 43, 45 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008) (“[T]here is no 
agreement on the theory and methodology of international law.  This lack of consensus challenges 
the very legitimacy of international law as an academic field.”). 
 226. Susan D. Franck, Essay, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment 
Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 770–73 (2008) (asserting that international 
legal scholars’ work could benefit by using empirical methods more often, as other legal scholars 
and international scholars have done). 
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could benefit from the work done by social scientists in examining the 
promises and perils of drawing conclusions from our research.227 
CONCLUSION 
International tax law case studies demonstrate the range of political, 
economic, and social contexts that inform theory about how best to approach 
the taxation of international income.228  Three integrated characteristics appear 
to describe case study research in the context of international tax legal 
scholarship.  First, international tax case studies are characterized by their 
subject, i.e., the case.  The case may be an event or a phenomenon that 
involves, implicates, or explains aspects of the taxation of international 
activities.  Second, case studies are characterized by what may be defined as an 
approach—namely, the author’s attempt to engage in a detailed exploration of 
the case, mainly using sources and approaches familiar to legal scholarship, but 
increasingly integrating sources and approaches common in other disciplines.  
Third, international tax case studies are characterized in terms of their purpose.  
International tax law scholars engage in case studies for a wide range of 
purposes, from illustrative (the majority of the cases), to demonstrative (a few 
cases), to proof-providing (even fewer cases). 
We could do more, and better.  Legal scholars’ use of case studies to 
develop theory in international tax law is mostly implicit, and this article has 
attempted to draw conclusions about the authors’ goals and purposes by 
inference, as well as through the qualitative approach of interviewing the 
authors themselves.  But the primary purpose of this undertaking is more than 
 
 227. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975, 
979–80 (2005) (discussing the growth of empiricism in international law recommending the use 
of modern case studies); Kelley L. Mayer, Reform of United States Tax Rules Governing 
Electronic Commerce Transfer Pricing, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 283, 302 (1999) (“[C]ase 
studies should be conducted to determine the ramifications of applying different treaty provisions 
to various countries in differing circumstances.”); Kunio Mikuriya, Summary Remarks at the 
Second Joint WCO/OECD Conference on Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation (May 23, 
2007), available at http://www.wcoomd.org/speeches/?v=1&lid=1&cid=7&id=51 (“At the global 
level the WCO and the OECD should continue their existing cooperation relating to the sharing 
of knowledge, the development of training material, and the e-learning module initiative.  This 
cooperation could be further enhanced by the suggestion to create a small focus group of customs 
and tax experts to dialogue on and study issues involving the WTO and the business community 
initially targeting practical and concrete case studies based on commercial realities.”).  For an 
argument that socio-legal perspectives on international law provide valuable information, see 
Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1266 
(2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005)). 
 228. Stake, supra note 4, at 460 (“Case studies are of value in refining theory, suggesting 
complexities for further investigation as well as helping to establish the limits of 
generalizability.”). 
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that of documenting the contours of what I perceive as a valuable approach to 
international tax law scholarship.  It is, rather, to suggest that the growing use 
of case studies to develop international tax theory could be expanded and 
enriched by consulting the methodology considerations which inform social 
science research.  Audiences for social science research expect rigorous 
analysis of empirical evidence in order to show us something about how the 
world works.  Audiences for international tax law, like audiences for legal 
scholarship in general, have been content with the traditional, typically non-
empirical, approach to case review.  In a world of complex economic, 
financial, and social relationships, using qualitative socio-legal methods to 
study our cases represents our best hope of developing new knowledge and, 
with it, new and better theory for international taxation. 
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